NDU.KR.UA — Інфохаб: парламентська аналітика України

Ukraine’s parliamentary Question Time with the Government on 21 August became a stress test of the country’s preparations for the 2026–2027 heating season. The Government presented substantial figures on repaired capacity, gas reserves, infrastructure protection and decentralised generation. MPs, however, brought the debate back from national gigawatts to individual communities, hospitals, boiler houses, apartment blocks and the people preparing to endure a fifth winter of full-scale war.

That gap — between national energy indicators and the actual readiness of individual communities — defined the Government Question Time held in Ukraine’s Parliament.

A fifth wartime winter: the Government’s starting point

The central energy report was delivered by Denys Shmyhal, Ukraine’s First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy.

His principal message was deliberately cautious: Ukraine’s power system is currently operating in a stable mode and scheduled power cuts are not being applied, but the situation may change depending on the intensity of further Russian attacks.

According to Shmyhal, approximately 15 GW of electrical capacity is available during the evening peak when cogeneration and imports are included. Nuclear power accounts for more than 40% of the total, thermal power plants for 25%, and hydropower for around 15%.

Six of Ukraine’s nine available nuclear units are generating electricity, while three are undergoing scheduled maintenance. The Government expects available capacity to reach 19.6 GW by 1 November and 21.4 GW by the end of 2026.

Shmyhal added a crucial qualification: these targets remain achievable only if Russia does not destroy capacity that Ukraine has already repaired or restored.

That condition captures the central dilemma of Ukraine’s preparations. The country is repairing its energy system, protecting it, accumulating reserves and installing new generation while simultaneously preparing for renewed attacks on recently rebuilt facilities.

Five pillars of Ukraine’s winter preparations

Repair and restoration

According to the Government, approximately 4.8 GW of generating capacity has already been repaired. Another 4 GW is undergoing planned maintenance or restoration. Overall, more than 10 GW is expected to be repaired or constructed during the year.

Ukraine is also receiving equipment dismantled from decommissioned European power plants and combined heat and power facilities. More than 3,300 tonnes of equipment has arrived from Lithuania and Germany, with additional deliveries expected from Latvia.

This provides a practical advantage. Proven engineering units can be installed much faster than purpose-built replacement equipment can be manufactured for every damaged Ukrainian facility.

Accumulating energy resources

Ukraine currently has 14.3 billion cubic metres of natural gas in storage. The Government says accumulation is running ahead of schedule. Earlier preparations identified 13.2 billion cubic metres as the minimum required at the start of the heating season.

Naftogaz has contracted more than 2.09 billion cubic metres of imported gas, approximately 2 billion cubic metres of which had already been imported between January and July. Coal stocks at power stations are also reported to be above planned levels.

Separate fuel reserves are being assembled for generators, critical infrastructure, eastern regions and frontline communities.

Protecting energy infrastructure

The Government’s approach combines active defence by air-defence and electronic-warfare systems with passive engineering protection. By the date of the parliamentary report, approximately 200 second-level protective structures had been completed.

Parliament supported the allocation of UAH 40 billion to strengthen the resilience of regions and municipalities. More than UAH 35 billion has already been distributed for infrastructure protection, backup power and the development of decentralised electricity and heat generation.

Shmyhal nevertheless acknowledged that no engineering solution can provide absolute protection. Several ballistic missiles carrying large warheads can damage even heavily protected facilities. The purpose of engineering protection is therefore to prevent total destruction and reduce the time required to restore operations.

Distributed generation

Ukraine already has approximately 1.8 GW of decentralised gas-fired generation in operation. The Government plans to add another 800 MW by the end of the year. More than 280 installations are currently being assembled or constructed.

In his answers to MPs, Shmyhal clarified that the broader target is to have up to 3 GW of decentralised gas generation operating in municipalities and at state-owned enterprises.

A separate tender has been launched for 1.5 GW of new highly flexible gas-fired generation. The result, however, is expected only by the end of 2027. It is therefore a medium-term investment rather than a complete answer to the risks of the coming winter.

Ukraine has also installed approximately 1 GW of energy-storage capacity. According to the Energy Minister, its combined capacity has increased more than 300-fold over the past year.

International support

Almost EUR 507 million has been contributed to the Ukraine Energy Support Fund since the beginning of the year. Distribution hubs have supplied nearly 6,000 tonnes of generators, transformers, cogeneration units, modular boiler houses and spare parts to regions and municipalities.

The Government has also launched an “Energy Ramstein” coordination format and a Single Energy Pipeline — a consolidated portfolio designed to show international partners a structured national list of projects and equipment needs rather than a series of unrelated requests from individual companies.

MPs turned the report into a stress test

Members of Parliament did not dispute the importance of repairs, gas reserves or international assistance. Their questions focused on whether large national indicators were being translated into genuine readiness on the ground.

Anatolii Burmich asked what share of this winter’s energy supply would be decentralised and whether new generation would be capable of supporting both critical infrastructure and the population.

The answer demonstrated the scale of the Government’s plans, but it also highlighted their dependence on local authorities. Municipalities must identify their needs, prepare sites and ensure that equipment is installed, connected, protected and maintained.

This is where a national energy programme becomes a test of local administrative capacity.

Oleksandr Koltunovych asked whether regional resilience plans would be implemented in full and how the Government intended to address electricity-price volatility for industrial consumers.

The Government confirmed that electricity prices for businesses remain market-based, in part because Ukraine is integrated into the European power system through ENTSO-E.

Prices for households, Shmyhal said, would remain unchanged throughout the coming heating season. He cited tariffs of UAH 4.32 per kWh of electricity and UAH 7.96 per cubic metre of natural gas.

Fixed household tariffs, however, do not remove the financial pressure on energy companies or the risk of accumulating additional debt across the sector.

Businesses under attack

Yaroslav Zhelezniak asked whether the next state budget would contain dedicated financial support for businesses damaged by Russian missile and drone attacks.

Shmyhal acknowledged the scale of the losses. More than 300 filling stations alone had reportedly been damaged or destroyed over approximately six months.

Yet the Government does not plan to create a separate budget line to compensate energy-sector businesses. Support is expected to come through insurance mechanisms, the Ukraine Energy Support Fund and financing for the restoration of critical infrastructure, regardless of ownership.

That leaves a significant policy gap for companies that may not formally qualify as critical infrastructure but still provide fuel, logistics, food supplies, jobs and essential services to local communities.

For the Ukrainian economy, energy resilience is not limited to power stations. It also depends on whether businesses can reopen after an attack and whether local supply chains can continue functioning.

Firewood, electric heating and water: the winter arithmetic of municipalities

Larysa Bilozir raised the sharp increase in firewood prices and the difficulties municipalities face when purchasing fuel for schools, hospitals, kindergartens and municipal facilities.

The Government does not plan to introduce a price ceiling for firewood, referring to market principles and Ukraine’s European-integration commitments.

Instead, support for residents of frontline territories will continue through a programme involving UN agencies. Assistance for purchasing a household’s winter firewood supply is expected to exceed UAH 19,000.

This is important social support. It does not, however, resolve the procurement problem for municipalities and public institutions confronted by rising prices, limited supply and heavily constrained local budgets.

Anton Yatsenko raised the situation of approximately 22,000 multi-storey residential buildings heated by electricity. For these buildings, losing electricity also means losing heat.

The Government again placed a significant share of responsibility on local authorities. Municipalities are expected to provide high-capacity generators, establish resilience centres and include electrically heated buildings in local networks of decentralised generation.

Yet installing a generator beside an apartment block is not simply a procurement exercise. It requires fuel, a safe connection, regular maintenance, protection, trained operators and sufficient capacity.

Without those elements, a generator may remain an expensive item in a municipal report rather than a functioning source of emergency heat.

The cost and reliability of water services also emerged during the parliamentary exchange. The Government stressed that water tariffs are determined locally and must reflect the complete cost of water supply and wastewater treatment.

For wartime municipalities, however, water is not an ordinary market service. It is critical infrastructure dependent on electricity, backup generation, protected pumping stations and the financial capacity of residents and local utility companies.

Sumy exposed the gap between planning and reality

One of the most revealing exchanges concerned preparations in the Sumy region, which borders Russia and remains under constant attack.

According to figures presented by MP Ihor Vasyliev, only 2 MW of an intended 36 MW of additional generating capacity had been commissioned — less than 7% of the target.

Shmyhal acknowledged the extreme complexity of the situation. Some newly installed equipment, including units supplied by international partners, had already been destroyed by Russian FPV drones.

Within 20 kilometres of the Russian border, repair work can be nearly impossible because Russian forces systematically target energy-repair teams.

In some of these communities, generators are no longer a backup. They are becoming the only relatively reliable source of electricity.

The Sumy case demonstrates why formal measurements of implementation do not always reflect operational reality. It also shows why wartime conditions should not be used to conceal administrative failures in areas where delays result from slow procurement, unprepared sites or inadequate coordination rather than direct combat activity.

Ukraine needs a system capable of distinguishing between the two.

This is particularly important for Ukraine’s industrial regions.

Kryvyi Rih depends on more than domestic electricity supplies. The city’s stability relies on industrial facilities, water and wastewater systems, hospitals, transport, pumping stations, district-heating networks and other essential social infrastructure.

Distributed generation should therefore be planned not as a collection of separate installations but as part of an integrated system protecting the basic functions of the territory.

European integration cannot mean market prices alone

The Ukrainian Government is right to emphasise integration with ENTSO-E, market rules and support from European partners.

Distributed generation, energy storage, cogeneration, direct power-purchase agreements and flexible balancing capacity are all consistent with the direction of European energy policy.

But the European model also requires transparency, accountability, consumer protection and measurable standards for the reliability of essential services.

European integration cannot be invoked only when explaining why firewood prices should not be capped or why businesses must purchase electricity at market rates.

It also requires targeted support for vulnerable consumers, investment in energy efficiency, protection of access to basic services and clear responsibility on the part of authorities and infrastructure operators.

That balance remains one of the weakest elements in the Government’s public communication.

What Parliament should monitor

The figures presented by the Government provide grounds for cautious optimism. Before winter begins, however, Parliament, its committees and local councils should monitor:

• the actual commissioning of additional capacity, rather than merely the purchase or delivery of equipment;
• implementation of regional resilience plans with named officials and binding deadlines;
• readiness of boiler houses, water utilities, hospitals and electrically heated apartment buildings;
• fuel reserves for emergency generation;
• protection of newly installed generating units from missile and drone attacks;
• the financial capacity of municipalities to maintain the equipment they receive;
• support mechanisms for businesses damaged by Russian attacks;
• assistance for households dependent on firewood, electricity or autonomous heating;
• the difference between nominal generating capacity and capacity actually available during peak demand.

The central conclusion

Ukraine is preparing for its fifth full-scale wartime winter with greater operational experience, substantial gas reserves, an extensive repair programme, growing international support and a rapidly expanding network of decentralised generation.

But between 15 GW at the national level and a warm apartment in a particular city lies a long chain of responsibility.

It includes procurement, installation, grid connection, fuel, engineering protection, municipal finances, maintenance crews working under fire and individual officials accountable for implementation.

It is at this level that the Government’s strategy will either become genuine national resilience or remain an impressive collection of targets.